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ARGUMENT

l.

The Court erred in overruling defendants• general
demurrer to plaintiffs' first cause of action-------J

2.

The Court erred in overruling defendants' general
demurrer to plaintiffs' second cause of action------1

3. The Court erred in rendering judgment for plaintiffs

on the first cause as amended when the same
does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action----------------------------------1

4. There is a variance between the pleadings and the

proof in first cause of action----------------------1

5. There is

a variance between the pleadings and the
proof in second cause of action----------------------

6. That the conclusion (b)

of first cause of action is

not supported by the findings of the pleadings-------

7.

That the Court erred in trying to maintain ju:r:isdiction
of second cause of action, after rendering a decision thereon, until after first cause of action
should be determined in the Supreme Court------------

8.

The Court erred in making one of the issues in dispute
at the beginning of the_ trial the valid delivery
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In the Supreme Court or the State or Utah
GENEVE GRAEHL BURT, LORELE BURT NEFF, KARLEE.N
BURT, BONNIE. A. BURT,
SHANNA G. BURT, JOHN G.
BURT.
Plaintiffs a;nd Respondents.
vs.
LUELLA H. BURT, Administratrix of the estate of John A.
Burt, deceased; LUELLA H.
BURT, an individual; EMERSON H. BURT, MRS·. HELEN
B. REED, MRS. D·OROTHY B.
FLOWERS, LEST'E,R C. BURT,
MILTON F. BURT,
Defendants and Appellamts.

No. 7313

FAC·TS.

The brief heretofore filed by ap~p,ellants contains
a short statement of facts, the text of the complaint
and answer, set out in full .as originally filed, together
with the pre-trial statement. The facts. of the cas.e are
therein subs.tantia.lly set forth so that more in that re. g.ard is thought unnecessary except as comment upon
the fa.cts is required during the argument that follows·.
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9. The Court erred in making one

.
of the issues in dispute

at the beginning of the trial the delivery of the
deed for a special purpose only and without the nee-,
cessary intent to vest title in grantee-------------1
I

10. The Court erred in permitting Geneve Graehl Burt over
the objection of defendants to testify what was
in her own mind as is shown in the following
testimony found on pp. 106 and 107 of transcript---1

1

11. The Court erred when it failed to follow its ruling----1
12. The Court erred in failing to make findings, .conclusions and judgment as to whether or not the
plaintiffs are guilty of laches and barred by the
statute of limitations as presented in the issues
by the last bhree.unnumbered paragraphs of defendants' affirmative defense to the first cause
of ~ction------------------------~------------------j

13. That the Court erred in failing to make findings, conclu-

sions and judgment as to whether or not the plaintiff
are guilty of laches and barred by the statute of
limitations as presented in the issues in paragraph
7 of defendants• answer to plaintiffs' second cause
of action-------------------------------------------·

14. That the conclusions of law and judgment concerning the
first cause of action are contrary to law-----------·

15. That the conclusions of law and judgment concerning the
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Appellants here were defendants and respondents
were plaintiffs in the trial court. Both titles have been
used in referring to the parties with the thought that
doing so makes the reading of this. brief easier.
Geneve Graehl Burt is the real party plaintiff because the other plaintiffs are her children and join to
show that they .agree with the position taken by their
mother in this action, but .seek no relief on their own
behalf.
ARGUMENT
Appellants set out fifteen separate assignments of
error to justify their app-eal in this cas.e.
The first is that the trial court erred in overruling
the demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Respondents'
answer to that contention is that there was no error and
that even though the ruling had been erroneous still
it was n<?'t prejudicial and so not reversible. Unless there
is a basis upon which injury or prejudice may be presumed the error, if any, must be overlooked and is not
reversible. Ryan v. Beaver County 21 Pac. (2nd) 858,
82 Utah 27; Olsen v. H. D. Kress Co. Inc. 48 P'. 2nd 430,
87 Utah 51. Counsel for defendants submitted his demurrer without argument and informed counsel for
plaintiffs that as he wa.s filing an answer at the same
time, he would not resist overruling of his demurrer.
He accordingly asserted no particular objection to the
complaint and expre,S:sed no view or interpretation of it
which caused him surprise or resulted in prejudice,
during the course of said trial.
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'~The

court must in every s.tage of an action disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings, which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of
such error or defect." Section 104-14~7 U.C.A.
1943.
''Tith respect to this rule, this court has said:
''The burden, of course, is on the app~ella.nt
to show, not only error, but prejudicial effect as
,,~ell." J en~en v. Utah Railway Co. 270 Pac. 349
p. 3G~~ 7~ Utah 366 p. 400.
Furthermore, as shown by the p~re-trial statement
set out on pages 13-16 of Appellants' Brief, the court
held a pre-trial conference in said caus.e on December
3, 1948 at which time the issues were fully discussed,
and the scope of the trial determined. Counsel for p~lain
tiffs at the outset of said pre-trial conference informed
the court and counsel that if counsel for defendants
intended to assert that the complaint alleged a legal.
delivery of the deed by Geneve Graehl Burt to J-ohn
A. Burt, deceased, .and that su·ch a p~leading was. in
effect an admission of delivery in the legal s,ense with
intent to vest title in the said John A. Burt then counsel
for said plaintiffs would ask leave· to amend and so
remove grounds for such a view of the complaint. Because of that statement and others which followed, the
court indicated that whether there was a delivery in
the legal sense would be made one of the issues of the
trial.
The trial proceeded accordingly and plaintiff was
permitted to make the amendments to the complaint
which had been mentioned and discussed at the pre-trial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

conference. It seems cle,ar that the general rule respecting the effect of amendments after a ruling on a demurrer applies :
'':Any error in the ruling on a demurrer to
a complaint becomes immaterial if the complaint
is amended and the issues made on the amended
pleading are tried and judgment rendered thereon.'' Bancroft Code Practice Vol. 9, p. 9743 sec.
7410.

At the commencement of the trial appellants were
already advised and aware of respondents' theory of
the case. They proceeded to trial without objection as
to the issues ; they did not contest the scope. of the trial
as outlined by the pre-trial statement and cannot now
be permitted to say that they were prejudiced by an
alleged error in overruling the demurrer to the first
cause of action in the complaint.
The second assignment of error is that the trial
court erred in overruling the demurrer to the second
cause of action in the complaint. The foregoing argument may als.o be set up here in refutation of appellants'
contention and in support of respondents' position
that there was no error and though there was, it was
not prejudicial. The position of respondent Geneve
Graehl Burt was akin to the position of the supposed
wife in the case of Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P. (2nd)
262, 107 U ta.h 239. There the parties had assumed the
relation of man and wife knowing that one of the essentials of a valid marriage was not complied with-that
the interlocutory decree of divorce of the "'rife had not
become final. Recognizing that an ineq~itable situation
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would result, that one

p~a.rty

to this arrangement would

be denied a share in the fruit·s of the joint labors, and
that the other party would be unjustly enriched, this
court held that the trial court ''in the exercise of its
equitable power had jurisdiction to require an equitable
distribution of the proP,ertyi 1acquired during the time
the litigants were cohabiting as. man and wife.'' Cas,es
cited in support of that principle were: Sanguinetti v.
Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P. 2d 8t45, 111 A.L.R. 342,
·F'igoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal., 29'5 P. 339; Fuller v. F'uller,
33 Kan. 582, 7 P. 241; Werner v. Werner 59 Kan. 39H,
53 P. 127, 41 L.R.A. 349, 68 Am. S,t. Rep. 372; Krauter
v. Krauter, 79 Ok, 30, 190 P'. 1088; Deed v. Strode, 6
Idaho 317, 55 P. 656, 43 L.R.A. 207, 9'6 Am. St. Rep.
:2G3; Bu?kley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079, 126
. .\.m. St. Rep'. 900; Powers v. Powers, 117 Wash. 248,
200 P. 1080.
Under similar facts there being a cause of action
E,tated in the Jenkins case, it follows that there was a
cause of action stated in favor of Geneve Graehl Burt,
consequently there was no error in overruling the demurrer to the second cause of action.
Respondents do not dispute the statement of appel.tants in their brief, page 30, that as a general rule title
to the property of a decedent vests. in his heirs. It is
urgently contended ho-vYever, that in a case like that
at bar such title is .subject to the equitable claim of one
lvho frugally and industriously toiled to raise and provide for decedent's. children and to preserve, ~n1prove
and enhance decedent's estate.
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As to assignment of error No. 3, that judgment
~hould not have been rendered where a cause of action
was not stated, respondents. contend that their first
c'-luse of action allege~s. and the evidence proves facts
which justify judgment for Geneve Graehl Burt; that
having real property in he-r own name, and without receiving any money or other thing of value therefor
( s.tipula.ted and included in the pre-trial s,tatement), not
exercising a will or intention of her own to pass title
in her lifetime, she signed the deed and surrendered it
to said John A. Burt. When asked whether or not she
intended, during her lifetime, to part with title to that
property, her answer was "Absolutely no." (tr. 107).
To that answer there was no contradiction except the
mute inference arising from the finding of the deed
1n decedent's safety deposit box.
In assignment of error No. 4 appellants rely upon
an alleged variance between pleading and proof in
plaintiff's first cans.e of action. Whether there is a
variance depends not upon what the complaint contained
alone but up~n what was tra,ns.acted at the pre-trial conference, the contents of the pretrial statement and the
amendments to the complaint permitted by the trial
court. Appellants s.eem to ignore all of these and point
to the fact with seeming significance that no evidence
was introduced to prove their interpretation of plaintiffs' complaint. Ordinarily in a case where, as here,
plaintiffs are handicapped by the proliihitions of the
''dead man's. statute,'' and this case was no exception,
all the available evidence is not introduced. That the
record is not more replete with details of transactions
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between Geneve Graehl Burt and John A. Burt is
chargeable to appellants and to their insistence that
her lips be sealed and the facts suppres·sed surrounding
the signing and surrender of the deed to her home.
Assignment of error No ..5 charges a material variance between the pleadings and the proof in plaintiffs'
second cause of action. Appellants take the view that
~eneve Graehl Burt, regardles.s of other f,acts., could
never properly lay claim to any interest in the estate
of John A. Burt because the marriage ceremony by
which they justified their relation did not meet the requirements of and conform to the Utah statutes 'relating
to marriage. Numerous adjudicated cases as cited above
in the argument relating to the second assignment of
error refute that view. s.ome have permitted a recovery by one of the contracting parties. seemingly to p~re
vent alone an unjust enrichment and to save the party
the product of his labor in building up· and accumulating
said estate.

In the Jenkins v. Jenkins case, supra, it can hardly
be .said that the parties. were innocently unaware of the
requirement which operated to prevent their marriage
from being valid and binding in the eyes. of the law.
They knew that the wife's decree of divorce had not
become final. Yet that fa.ct dld not shackle equity and
prevent it from coming to the aid of that plaintiff and
decree to her a proper distribution of the pTop·erty
accumulated by their joint efforts.
As to her marriage to John A. Burt, p1aintiff, Geneve Gra,ehl Burt, testified as follows:
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0. You stated in your sworn complaint, you
thought you had, had been legally married; you
remember that you stated that, don't you~
A. I said, as far as our religious convictions go, of course, I am his wife; always will
be his wife unless I prove myself unworthy.
( tr. 120).
A. - - - we were firm in our convictions and
conscience is. what guided us. ( tr. 122).
She had participated in a ceremony of marriage,
performed by Israel Barlow ( tr. 100). They lived together as husband and wife, in perfect confidence and
with compatibility until the death of Mr. Burt. (tr.
109). To her mind the marriage was valid and legal,
made her the wife of John A. Burt and that she would
always be his wife unless she proved herself unworthy.
The allegation complained of in paragraph 10 of the
complaint is that plaintiff entered into what in good
faith "she thought'' was a valid and legal marriage.
It clearly referred to the state of mind of plaintiff
Geneve Grahel Burt with respect to said marriage and
the proof clearly revealed her belief and confidence in
it so that appellants were not deceived nor misled to
their prejudice. It is submitted, therefore, that there
was no variance or if any at all it was so slight and
immaterial as t9 be no cause for reversal whatever.
"It is a general rule under the codes. that no
variance between the allegation in a pleading and
the proof is deemed material unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice
in maintaining his. action or defense upon the
merits.'' Bancroft Code Pleading Vol. 1, sec.
702; Dobbs v. Rees, 49 Utah 270, 163, Pa.c. 255.
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There was no objection by defendants a.t the trial
that they had been prejudiced by a variance. And as.
has been said by the ldaho Supreme Court that if during the trial of a cause the defendant is misled to his
prejudice because of a variance between the allegations
of the complaint and the proofs he should then and there
notify the court of that fact and ask for proper relief;
if he does not, he will not be permitted to raise the
question on motion for new trial or an a.p,peal. Auilbach
v. Dahler 4 Idaho 654. 43 P:ac. 322.
In assignment of error No. 6 app~ellants complain
of the conclusion of the court as. to the first cause of
action that plaintiff should be allowed the p:roperty in
question. The court did find that the property had been
selected as a home for plaintiff and her children, that
the deed to said property showed Geneve Graehl as
g-rantee and that the deed to said p~roperty had not,
in law, been delivered by plaintiff to John_ A Burt and
that when she signed it she did not intend to part with
title to said property. The court thereupon concluded
that the deed from said plaintiff to John A. Burt should
be determined to he void and should be cancelled, and
that plaintiff should be allowed the said property. It
is submitted that the second is in effect a restatement
of the first, that to cancel the deed recorded by defendants is to allow 1o plaintiff the p~rop·erty which had
originally stood in her name.
In assignment of error No. 7 appellants complain
of the last paragraph of the deeree which p~rovided that:
"It is the further judgment of this court
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that should plaintiff by appeal or review of this
judgment be deprived of the ownership of the
property described in the foregoing paragraph
hereof, then and in that event, said plaintiff
should be granted and allowed an equitable in- ·
terest in the estate of deceased, John A. Burt,
the amount of such interest to be determined by
further proceedings in this court.''
This. was an equitable proceeding and it is inherently the power of a court of equity to so frame its
decree that in finally disposing of all rna tters justice
might be had between the parties.
In Ma.son v. E,llison, 160 P. 2nd 326, the Supreme
Court of Arizona in making a conditional decree said,
quoting from 19· Am. Jur. 23, sec. 123:
"In an equity case the court-adapts its
relief and molds its deerees to satisfy the requirements of the case and to conserve the equities of
the parties litigant. The court has such power
since its purpose is the accomplishment of justice
amid all the vicissitudes and intricacies of life.''
In Baumer v. Welsh, (Kan~) 226 P. 98, the following appears relative to the power of a court of equity:
''In a suit in equity to establish an interest
in specific real property and for appropriate
relief, the court, having acquired jurisdiction of
the parties .and of the subject matter and having
found that plaintiff has a specific interest in the
property, has power to so frame its decrees. as
to meet the exigencies of the situation and to
reach the ends of justice.''
And in a California case the court, going beyond
the injunction sought, said:
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"It is a cardinal rule of equity that the
court has power to make its decrees ef:fe,ctive
and that when it has jurisdiction of the parties
and of the subject matter its decree will be complete in order to terminate the litigation if possible." Santa Monica Ice Cold Storage Co. v.
Rossier et al. 109 P. 2nd 382.
Complaint is made by a.pp·ellants by assignments of
error 8 and 9 that the court imp,roperly made valid
delivery of the deed to John A. Burt and intent to vest
title in said John A. Burt issues for the trial of said
case. They were informed at the beginning of the pretrial conference that plaintiffs intended to amend the
complaint for that p~urpose. There was no objection
made to that proposal and before leaving said confer-ence the court indicated that said issues would be regarded as in dispute and .s.o to be· diBposed of at the
trial of said ease.
In the adoption of the rule providing for the pretrial procedure effective May 1, 1948, this court made
simplification of the issues one of the purpos,es of the
pre-trial process and further provided that:
''The court shall make an order-which limits.
the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of couns.el; and such
order when entered controls the subsequent
course of the action unless modified at the trial
to prevent manifest injustic~s. ,.,
Pursuant to that rule the court called a pre-trial
conference on December 3, 1948, at which counsel for
the parties were present. Couns,el for plaintiffs asked
to be allowed to make amendments so that valid de-
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livery of the deed in question would clearly be in issue
at the trial as well as the purpose of the deed. The trial
~udge made an outline of the matters admitted and the
matters in dispute and by re~ading his outline indicated
what his pre-trial order would be. At the beginning of
the trial the court said, ''We all agree that is a disputed
issue, and we are going to hear evidence about it."
(tr. 49).
Testimony on the
A. Burt wa.s introduced
defendants only ''on the
the terms of a written

purpose of the deed to John
and objected to by counsel for
ground it is attempting to vary
instrument." ( tr. 106).

In assignment of error No. 10 this same objection
that oral testimony was being introduced to vary the
terms of a written instrument is urged. By examination
of plaintiff it was sought· to demonstrate her intent when
she signed the deed in dispute. There: was no attempt
made .to change its terms.. The object was to establish its effect. Counsel contends that the court erred in
permitting plaintiff to testify respecting· her intention
not to transfer title to deceased. His objection was that
to permit her to testify would, by parol, vary the terms
of a written instrument. It is submitted that the purpose of the testimony was not to change· the terms of
the deed but to clarify and illuminate the circumstances
under which the deed was executed and the purpose· of
its execution. It may be contended with propriety that
a deed properly executed in the possession of the grantee
carries with it a presumption of delivery. Said presumption, however, by pToper evidence is rebuttable, the
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intention of grantor being of outstanding importance
in that respect. ''The intention of the parties, particu-

larly the grantor, is an essential and controlling element
of delivery of a. deed.'' 16 Am. J ur. 501 sec. 115.
''The presumption of delivery arising from
manual tradition, however, is· not conclusive and
may be rebutted by the evidence, the burden of
proving a valid delivery ordinarily resting upon
the party relying upon the instrument.'' Tighe
v. Davis (Mich.) 278t N.W. 60. See also Hood v.
Nichol (Ky.) 34 S.W. (2nd) 429; Blades v. Wilmington Trust Co. (N.C.) 178 S.E. 565, John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Chinn (Kan.) 28
Pac. 2nd 761; Cavett v. Pettigrew (Ark.) 3-2 S.W.
2nd 308; Rouland v. Burton (TIL) 15 N.E. (2nd)
920; Buchwald v. Buchwald (Md.) 199 A .. 800,
141 A.L.R. 308.
This court has recently had a similar question before it and had this to say with resp·ect to the importance
and materiality of the donor's intention in case of a
bill of sale.
' 'Before such instrument (bill of sale) can
have the effect of transferring any interest in
the property there must be a delivery with the
necessary intention. What the donor's intention
was may be shown by parol evidence without violating the rule against varying the terms of a
written instrument by such evidence, because the
object is not to change the terms of the instrument but to show whether the instrument ever
went into effect as a transfer of the prope~rty or
an interest therein. '' Jackson v. Jackson (Utah)
192 P. (2nd) 397.
Respondents submit in light of the foregoing au-
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thority there was no error 1n overruling defendants'
objection to the evidence.
Appellants' assignment of error No. 11 is almost
too general to merit any attention and is uncertain to
the point that it is difficult, almost impossible- in fact
to ascertain to which sta·tement of the court reference
is made. It is assumed that it is the statemen ( tr. 125126) where the court says :
''I think this evidence is objectionable, but
I am not going to put the burden on myself to go
back here and find out what is objectionable and
what isn't. It has come in-certain statements,
without any objection, and a general motion of
that nature, I wouldn't know which you want
stricken and which you wanted to have the motion apply to, and I think, however, that the
court will disregard the evidence that is incompetent, insofar as I am able to; is that's satisfactory, Mr. Young.''
Itis not evident wherein the court ignored an agreement as to the evidence in making its findings. We think
counsel does not seriously contend that prejudicial eiTOr
can be found in this. assignment.
A·ssignment of error No. 12 .and 13 assail the court
for failure to make findings and conclusion and judgment on the question of laches and limitations. Respondents say in answer that such defenses, if ever intended
to be, were not made and did not become issues at the
trial. Counsel made no meption of them in discussing
the proposed issues at the pre-trial conference; he made
no objection to their omission from the prepared PreTrial Statement; he introduced no evidence concerning
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either alledged defense during the course of the trial
and made no argument concerning them at the close
of the trial. Respondents contend that these alleged
defenses, with numerous other matters such as the allegation in the middle of page 3 of defendants' answer
that ''The Utah State Tax Commission insists that said
property be made part and parcel of his estate for taxation purposes,'' were "washed out" in the pre-trial
process and cannot now be made the ba~sis. for a rever.sal
of the judgment of the trial court. If that view of the
effect of the pre-trial process is not correct, then instea.d
o~ assisting in ''coping with the present over crowding
of court calendars-. '' as intended by the Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure which recommended its adop~
tion to this court, it would have just the opposite effect
and be merely another cumbersome process that would
entail greater delay rather than saving of time and
would increase uncertainty and confusion at the trial
rather than prevent it.
Assignment of error No. 14 complains of the conclusions of law and judgment of the First C!ause of
Action. Ap·pellants' objection seems to be that cancelling of the deed to John A. Burt and allowing of the
property described therein to respondent, Geneve Gra.ehl
Burt are inconsistent and at war with each other, as it is
said in Appellants' Brief, p~. 37,
''They endeavor to void the deed and at the
same time allow plaintiff the prop.erty. I fail to
see how they can do both.''
Actually the two p1rovisions are consistent and
parallel each other. The· earlier deed to such property
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showed Geneve Gra.ehl as grantee and was duly recorded. (Pre-Trial Statement.-tr. 27, 28). Canceling
the later one signed by her in which John A. Burt was
named a.s grantee re-established Geneve Graehl as the
title holder of reeord and ''allowed Geneve Graehl Burt
the property---.''
Ap·pellants deny that Geneve Graehl Burt owned
the property but insist on the contrary that she received
it merely as a trustee for John A. Burt, she being, as
appellants assert, "~So far as the law was concerneda stranger to him." They cite Anderson v. Cercone, 180
P. 586, 54 Utah 345, to supvort that position. That case
cited with approval 39 Cyc. P1). 118, 119'.
''It is a well settled rule of equity, in the
absence of statutory provisions otherwise, that
where property is paid for with money or assets
of one person, and the title thereto is taken in
the name of another person, in the absence of circumstances showing a different. intention or un~
derstanding a resulting trust in the property
arises in favor of the person whose money or
assets are so used,--- ,.,
By its own terms this rule appears not to be one
. of universal application :
''It is a vvell settled rule of equity - in the
absence of circumstances showing a different
intention or understanding- - - . ''
The transcript is full of evidence showing a different intention or understanding on the part of J'ohn A.
Burt. Mr. Edwin E. Johnson, who stated that he lived
on the property which adjoins, on the west, the property
occupied by plaintiff, Mrs. Geneve Graehl Burt, and that
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he was, at the time he te·s,tified; the Bishop of the
Evergreen Ward, testified that he talked to John A.
Burt during his lifetime. He said, ''Well, on several occasions I have talked to him along the line of what he
was going to do with the p1roperty; in fact at one time,
I tried to buy a strip off the lower end next to me from
him, and he intimated that he didn't care to sell any of
it, that he proposed to have a home there for his wife
and children." ( tr. 57).
Edward Caps on a man 74 years of age who had
lived in the locality of the Geneve Burt home on E~ver
green Street all his life, testified that he worked on the
Burt property improving it Respecting his conversations with Mr. John A. Burt, he s.aid on direct examination:
'' Q. Did he ever state to you in your conversations, whether that pla,ce belonged to Geneve~

A. Yes, he said that was for, for her and
the family.''
On cross examination he testified as follows.:

'' Q. Did he ever tell you that that was for
her during her lifetime~
A. Well, he told me on one occasion that
he gave her the place.
Q. He had told you on one occasion he had
given her the place~ _
A. Yes.
Q. And he didn't say whether he gave her
a life interest or the whole fee or what'
A. Yes; I understood him to say he give
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her the deeds to it, as near as I can remember."
(tr. 72).

C. H. Oa.rlquist, a former business associate of John
A. Burt, testified respecting a conversation he had with
appellant, Luella Burt.

,., Q. Did you have a convertation with Luella Burt regarding John A. Burt'
A. Yes, sir.

0. Will you state about when that was Mr.
CarlquJst'
A. It was in the afternoon of the day he
passed away.

Q. And will you relate the substance of that
.conversation so far as it concerns this plaintiff,
Geneve Burt' (tr. 86).
A. Luella Burt had been very fair to Mrs.
Geneve Graehl Burt because he had given her
that property .out in Millcreek, and it was a very
valuable p[ece of property - - - . '' ( tr. 88).

On cross examination Mr. C'arlquist testified:
'' Q. Didn't she aJ_so .say that that home up
there was to be for, not only Geneve but for the
children and that was all they were to get f

A. No, apparently a.t that time she thought
that the home was in Mrs. Geneve Graehl Burt's
name, and I praised her broadminded attitude
when I talked to Mr. Parkinson, so that is how it
came up.

Q. That was before the funeral'
A. Tha.t was before the funeral.
Q. And the safety box had been opened?
A. Yes, sir." ( tr. 88).
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Ralph E. Pitts, a neighbor, testified:

''Q. Did you have conversations with Mr.
Burt1

A.

A number of times.

Q. How did he refer to Geneve Graehl Burt
1n your

conversations~

A.

Well, just as wife and family.

Q.

Did he at any time make any statement

to you with respect to the property there as it
related to these plaintiffs 1

A. Yes, he talked to me on one or two occasions, and his chief concern seemed to be that
the home and property there should be as the
family wanted it. He made· the statement several
times that that wa.s their home, and they were
the ones to say how it should be. Now, I make
that statement because it was a small home and
they wer~they wanted to enlarge and make
changes from time to time, and he said that it
was their home, and, if that was their will, that
was the way he wanted it." ( tr. 90).
Plaintiff testified on cross examination respe·cting

the building of a house on the property in question:

"Q. But Mr. Burt knew about it before it
was built didn't he1
A.

Oh, yes, he knew they were building it.

Q.

He knew it so that he gave his

permi~

sion1
A. Not until I gave mine though. He considered it was my pla,ce, considered it was my
place to do with as I pleased. He never considered that was his place at all." (tr. 113).
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Again while under cross examination:

'' Q. He got that as a home~ for you~
A. Yes, he bought it for me when I was
so sick.
Q. The property that you are living in, he
purchased with his. own mone~slpeaking !Of
''he,'' Mr. Burt~
A.

Yes, he purchased it in my name for me.

Q.

And you paid

nothing~

A. No, I didn't pay anything." ( tr. 123).
Clearly in light of all these circumstances showing
a different intention on the part of John A. Burt it.
cannot be said that the rule relied upon by appellants
to ere ate a resulting trust applies. in this case.
As to error No. 15 respondents disagree with statement· of a.ppellants respecting the second cause of action that ',' Geneve Graeh] Burt, is trying to get a
part of the inheritance which rightfully, under the law,
belongs to ·an the children, of the dece~ased and his
legal wife, Luella H. Burt---.,., (Brief p. 42). Plaintiff
.sought the aid ·of a court of equity to have set apart
to her a fair sh~re of the e~state of the approximate
value of $90,000.00 she had helped to accumulate during 28 years of toil and hardship and to nullify the action
which would pauperize her and put her upon the charity
of her children in her dee1ining years. The law does not
make her an heir, but equity will not permit her to be
robbed. As was said by this court in the case of Jenkins
v. Jenkins, supra,
''In view of the fact that the plaintiff had
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only an interlocutory degree of divorce from her
prior marriage and said decree had not yet become final, she was still married at the time of
her purported marriage to defendant - - - . ''
'' - - - where, as here, both parties knew of
the interlocutory decree of divorce, which had
not yet become final, the court in the exercise of
its equitable power had jurisdiction to require
an equitable distribution of the property acquired
during the time the litigants were cohabiting as
man and wife."
Other courts have in similar cases done equity between the parties. even though in the eyes of the law
there had been no valid marriage to make them husband and wife--no relationship that would ve.st in one
an enforceabl~ right to claim part of the property owned
by the other.
In Fuller v. Fuller (Kan.) 7 P. 241; the court
denied alimony after an annulment of a s.upposed marriage, but said :
''It is our opinion, however, that in all judicial separations of persons who have lived together as husband and wife, a fair and equitable
division of their property should be had; - - - . "

In Werner v. Werner, (Kan) 5H P·. 127, the court
dissolved an invalid marriage and decreed a distribution of the property accumulated by the two during the
time they cohabited. In upholding the decree the Supreme Court of that S.tate said:
''But, independently of the statute of divorce we think the court had authority to decree
not o~ly an annulment of the marriage, but also
the division o:f the property which had been
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jointly accumulated by the parties.--- the testimony tends to show that the property they have
now is largely the result of their joint labor and
earnings .. She was active, industrious and faithful-she performed labor of the hardest and
most menial character-she was diligent, tireless
and economical in building up a business and in
gathering up the property which they held at
the time of the trial. A portion of the time the
title to the property was in her name -- - .The
court has the~ same power to make equitable division of the property so accumulated as it would
have in case of the dissolution of a business partnership. --- There is considerable testimony
tending to show--4hat her mis~conception of the
Jaw was largely due to the advice and influence
of the plaintiff in error. - ~ - the share which
was awarded her was no more than she was
justly entitled to."'
There are many situations here parallel to those
recited in the decision in the Werner case quoted from
above:
John A. Burt proposed marriage to plaintiff
---''continued his a~ttentions for quite a little
while.'' ( tr. 100).
''Well we had an awful struggle; conditions
was bad. Mr. Burt was broke when I married
him; he had absolutely nothing; he was in debt.
Of course, I went into it understanding all this,
but this was a matter of religious conviction with
me and him both, so we put our shoulders to
the wheel and pushed along. I worked; I did
some cleaning, I did sewing, not only for my
children out of cast-offs.
The court:
May I say "Then you say "I worked, did some
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cleaning" you worked outside the home for incomet
A. Yes, I did sewing for friends and relatives, and I did some cleaning out of the home
for others, and I did laundry work, did washing
and ironing and I did a little hairdressing. This
was while the children were young and my health
was a little better, and, then in addition to that,
I clothed my children practically on cast-offs..
I am a good sewer, and I made them beautiful
clothing out of cast-offs from my sisters. and my
relatives---." (tr. 101, 102).
Respecting John A. Burt,
''He always discuss-ed his business affairs
with me, his business enterpris-e-failures anc
succeses. He confided in me perfectly.''

Q. Did he ask your counsel and suggestions~

A. Yes, he asked for my counsel and we
considered things-he s.howed me different pieces
of property, and we were generally agreeable;
I had tried to please him.'' ( tr. 110).
Edwin E. Johnson, bishop of the L. D. S. Ward
where plaintiff lives, said:
''And M.rs. Burt has worked very consistently; in fact, for a woman of her a.ge, I wondered
at times how she could do the typ~e of work she
really did. ( tr. 6.2).
Mrs. Dorothy B. Sandberg, a former neighbor, testified that she had known plaintiff before s.he moved
onto Evergreen Street and stated respecting plaintiff:
''- -- that she was a very diligent worker,
that she made most of the childrens clothing;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
that she painted and repaired furniture. (tr. 79).
---that she was more industrious than the average mother, and that she had a lot of difficulties to overcome." (tr. 81).
Ralph E. J:1itts, a neighbor said:
' 'Well, she certainly took a more than a
motherly interest let's s.ay; the lights were burning many times after midnight so that (the children) could have the right dress .for school and
graduation dresses-she did a lot of sewingshe worked almost constantly; then they would
be done and gone for days at a time, and of
course we would go over and she would be sick
at that time. She would make the statement she
just had to go out and work because the weeds
we-re getting the best of her, s.o .she worked quite
constantly.'' ( tr. 48).
Mrs. Pitts testified that Mrs. Burt:
,., - - - has. been a very hard worker and has
done a whole lot of canning foods and making
clothes for the children; worked around the place.
They have papered roomsr--she and the girls done
painting and remodeling. She works outside, too,
except when she is sick.'' ( tr. 95).
Edward Capson, her neighbor, said that the home
of· plaintiff on Evergreen Street was in very poor shape
when they moved onto it.
''---it had been s~ge brush-it was waste
ground-there was nothing growed there, it just
was rocky. ---we carried rocks off of there; I
wheeled them off, and his children and wife
picked them off in buckets - when he wasn't
there, she was the one to tell me what to do. (tr.
70).--- she was always working outside. (tr. 73.)
- -- - his wife was always working. -- - she done
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all her own housework I guess. - - - she added to
the house. ( tr. 74). I suppose Mrs. Burt put in
more hours than anyone-she was always there
-she done pretty near everything, wateringwith the weeds---." (tr. 75).
Respondents believe that in light of the record
equity could do no less than void the deed to John A.
Burt and allow to Geneve Graehl Burt her home and,
on condition that those provisions should fail, set ap~art
to her a portion of the estate she helped create. They,
accordingly, submit their case and pray that this honorable court will affirm the decision of the trial court.

MERRILL C. FAUX,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Resp,ondents
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